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I.

A B OY AND HIS BREAKFAST

Seven-year-old Joshua Welch arrived at his Maryland school
on a cool March morning in 2013 before class began, just like any
other school day. He gathered with his friends in the cafeteria and
collected his breakfast, which included a toaster pastry. As Joshua
slowly ate his breakfast, he amused himself by attempting to chew
it into different shapes. A rectangular tart soon became a
misshapen mountain. After another few bites, the strawberry-filled
tart took on the crude shape of a two-dimensional gun. So young
Joshua did what any other kid his age would do: he “aimed” the
toaster pastry and said “bang.”1
* J.D. Candidate 2016, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, IL; B.A.
Anthropology 2008, University of Central Florida (#GoKnights), Orlando, FL.
First and foremost, I thank my parents, Jill and Scott, for never reprimandin g
me whenever I thought a stick looked like a gun, and for always having the
confidence that no matter what decisions I made in life, I would probably turn
out okay. I also thank my editors for catching what I did not and recognizing
that so much of who I am is embedded in this comment. Finally, I dedicate this
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Unfortunately for the second-grader, his pop-tart pistol started
a chain reaction that soon spiraled out of his control. Joshua’s
actions caused the teacher to get upset. 2 She reported the incident
to the school principal, and he in turn suspended Joshua for two
days per the school district’s zero tolerance policy. 3 The school
notified Joshua’s parents of his suspension, telling them that guns
have no place in school, whether imaginary or not. 4 For playing with
his toaster pastry, Joshua is branded for the rest of his school life. 5
A permanent mark will follow him to every public school he attends,
all because he chewed his breakfast into the shape of an “L” and had
the audacity to think it looked like a gun. 6
This Comment targets some of the worst offenders and failures
of zero tolerance policies. Part II of this Comment explores the
history of zero tolerance, which in many instances has the effect of
“throwing out the baby with the bathwater.”7 Part II further tracks

comment to every teacher I know—my mom, my girlfriend, and friends I made
in Japan, to list a few—who encounters kids like me every day and perseveres.
They deserve to be recognized for their hard work and should be unshackled
from burdensome bureaucratic restrictions that limit their ability to reach
students who need help the most.
1. Donna St. George, Anne Arundel Second-Grader Suspended For Chewing
His Pastry into the Shape of a Gun, WASH. POST (Mar. 4, 2013), www.washingto
npost.com/local/education/anne-arundel-second-grader-suspended-for-chewinghis-pastry-into-the-shape-of-a-gun/2013/03/04/44c4bbcc-84c4-11e2-98a3- b3db6
b9ac586_story.html.
2. See Wayne Harris, Pop Tart Gun, Josh Welch: School Suspends 7-YearOld for Biting Pop Tart Pastry into “Shape of Gun,” ABC15.COM (Mar. 4, 2013,
4:42 PM), www.abc15.com/news/national/pop-tart-gun-josh-welch-school-su sp
ends-7-year-old-for-biting-pop-tart-pastry-into-shape-of-gun (reporting Joshua
as saying the teacher was “pretty mad”). Although the school board later said
that Joshua was suspended for ongoing incidents, this reasoning conflicts with
the story the school gave his parents the day he was suspended. Id. According
to the original notice given to the parents, the suspension revolved entirely
around the boy’s actions at breakfast that morning. Id.
3. See MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-305(a)(1) (West 1996) (giving broad
discretion to school principals to suspend students as long as they act within
the confines of the county board’s rules on suspensions); Anne Arundel County
Public Schools, Policy JCC(D)(5) (issued Aug. 20, 2014), www.aacps.org/aacps/
boe/board/newpolicy/Sections/section_900/adminreg902.03D.pdf (vesting in the
principal sole determination of a student’s guilt and punishment regarding
possession of a weapon).
4. See Harris, supra note 2 (noting the school informed parents that “[a]
student used food to make an inappropriate gesture.”).
5. Joe Burris, Official Says Arundel Schools Should Uphold Suspension in
Pastry Gun Incident, BALTIMORE SUN (Jun. 30, 2014), http://articles.baltim o re
sun.com/2014-06-30/news/bs-md-pastry-kid-recommend-0701- 20140630_1_pas
try-gun-incident-b-j-welch-joshua-welch [hereinafter Burris, Pastry Gun].
6. Id.
7. Glenn W. Muschert & Eric Madfis, Fear of School Violence in the PostColumbine Era, in RESPONDING TO SCHOOL VIOLENCE : CONFRONTING THE
COLUMBINE EFFECT 13, 29 (Glenn W. Muschert, et al. eds., 2014) [hereinafter
Muschert & Madfis, Fear of School Violence].
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the state of free speech in schools, and the current analyses courts
use to address threatening language. While many articles have
addressed zero tolerance in schools, very few have discussed the
pendulum swinging back the other way. 8
Studies have shown that zero tolerance policies adversely
affect minority students, 9 and the extensive reach of zero tolerance
can have a chilling effect on all student speech. 10 Part III of this
comment scopes out some of the most appalling examples of zero
tolerance abuses, 11 while also analyzing courts’ inabilities to correct
the problems. 12 Part III continues by reloading the oft-debated data
about school violence to explore why extremely rare incidents like
school shootings draw such drastic countermeasures as zero
tolerance. 13 Finally, Part IV takes aim at plans intended to
maintain school safety while also providing students with an
adequate learning environment. 14 Part IV shoots for providing

8. See Rebecca Morton, Note, Returning “Decision” to School Discipline
Decisions: An Analysis of Recent, Anti-Zero Tolerance Legislation, 91 WASH. U.
L. REV . 757, 759 (2014) (discussing anti-zero-tolerance legislation in Texas,
North Carolina, Colorado, and Massachusetts).
9. Jacob Kang-Brown et al., A Generation Later: What We’ve Learned About
Zero Tolerance in Schools, 3-4 (2012), www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resource s
/downloads/zero-tolerance-in-schools-policy-brief.pdf. Middle schools suspend
black students nearly four times as often—and Latino students twice as often—
as whites. Id. at 3.
10. See Richard Salgado, Comment, Protecting Student Speech Rights While
Increasing School Safety: School Jurisdiction and the Search for Warning Signs
in a Post-Columbine/Red Lake Environment, 2005 BYU L. REV . 1371, 1390
(2005) (asking whether students will have to self-censor in order to avoid
triggering a punishment).
11. See, e.g., Mayra Cuevas, 10-Year-Old Suspended for Making Fingers into
Shape of Gun, CNN (Mar. 4, 2014, 9:26 PM), www.cnn.com/2014/03/04/us/ohio boy-suspended-finger-gun/ (suspending an Ohio student for making a finger
gun); Maya Rhodan, Gun Hand Gesture Gets Student Suspended, Revives
Debate, TIME (Sept. 10, 2013), http://swampland.time.com/2013/09/10/han dgesture-of-gun-gets-student-suspended-revives-debate/ (pointing his fingers in
the shape of a gun gets a Maryland student suspended); Adam Edelman, Boy,
7, Suspended for Throwing Imaginary Grenade, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS (Feb.
5, 2013, 6:24 PM), www.nydailynews.com/news/national/boy-7-suspended-th ro
wing-imaginary-grenade-article-1.1256200 (throwing an imaginary grenade to
“save the world” resulted in a Colorado boy’s suspension).
12. See generally Salgado, supra note 10 (providing examples of cases where
the court failed to alleviate a student’s punishment).
13. SIMONE ROBERS , ET AL., INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY :
2014 at 7 (2015), www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/iscs14.pdf.
14. E.g., Arne Duncan, U.S. Sec’y of Educ., Rethinking School Discipline,
Remarks at The Academies at Frederick Douglas High School, Baltimore, MD
(Jan. 8, 2014), www.ed.gov/news/speeches/rethinking-school-discipline (outlining
alternatives to removal from the classroom); Jeffrey R. Sprague, et al.,
Encouraging Positive Behavior, in RESPONDING TO SCHOOL VIOLENCE :
CONFRONTING THE COLUMBINE EFFECT, 157, 158 (Glenn W. Muschert, et al.
eds., 2014) (reinforcing positive behavior creates a better learning environment
than punishing negative behavior); Christopher Boccanfuso & Megan Kuhfeld,
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students with enough leeway to use their imagination without
school administrators firing off suspensions left and right.

II. HOW ZERO TOLERANCE AND THE COURTS LIMIT THE
ABILITY TO “E XPRESS YOURSELF”15 IN SCHOOL
A. From the Streets to the Schools—The Evolution
of Zero Tolerance
Zero tolerance began as a customs enforcement tool in the
1980s. 16 Zero tolerance gave government officials a broad brush
with which to paint an alleged violator. 17 These policies eliminated
the guesswork in handing down punishments: if someone did the
crime, then he or she must do the time. 18 The practice quickly
gained traction in other areas, moving from customs enforcement to
pollution regulation and eventually into the school system. 19
The underlying premise of zero tolerance policies is that
relatively minor offenses left unchecked will lead to greater and
greater offenses causing serious disruption or destruction. 20 In
Multiple Responses, Promising Results: Evidence-Based, Nonpunitive
Alternatives to Zero Tolerance, CHILD TRENDS (Mar. 2011), www.nea.org/assets
/docs/alternatives-to-zero-tolerance.pdf [hereinafter Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld,
Multiple Responses] (creating programs that emphasize positive reinforcement
can benefit children).
15. N.W.A, Express Yourself, on STRAIGHT O UTTA COMPTON (Ruthless
Records 1988). The irony of referencing this song is that the group realized that
to evade censorship and promote free expression it would have to avoid much of
the language and ideas that it embraced in other songs. Id. Similarly, students
must abandon parts of themselves in order to evade discipline in the current
school structure. See Salgado, supra note 10, at 1405 (noting that the way
teenagers verbalize their identities is through “the media they consume,”
including rap and hip hop music).
16. Russell J. Skiba, Zero Tolerance, Zero Evidence: An Analysis of School
Disciplinary Practice, 2 (2000), www.indiana.edu/~safeschl/ztze.pdf.
17. Steven C. Teske, A Study of Zero Tolerance Policies in Schools: A MultiIntegrated Systems Approach to Improve Outcomes for Adolescents, 24 J. CHILD
& ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC NURSING 88, 88–89 (2011).
18. See Philip Mongan & Robert Walker, “The Road to Hell Is Paved With
Good Intentions”: A Historical, Theoretical, and Legal Analysis of Zero Tolerance Weapons Policies in American Schools, 56 PREVENTING SCH. FAILURE
233, 238 (2012) (stating that a lack of mens rea in zero tolerance laws leaves
uncertainty as to the correct offender).
19. Skiba, supra note 16, at 2.
20. See Teske, supra note 17, at 89 (citing the “Broken Windows” theory of
crime as the basis for zero tolerance).
This theory analogizes the spread of crime to a few broken windows in a
building that go unrepaired and consequently attract vagrants who break more
windows and soon become squatters. The squatters set fires inside the building,
causing more damage or maybe destroying the entire building. The broken
windows theory argues that communities should get tough on the minor
offenses and clean up neighborhoods to deter serious crimes. Thus, it becomes
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order to prevent the most extreme offenses, the slightest infractions
need to be punished. 21 Shifting to zero tolerance also allowed
officials to punish perpetrators where they were previously
unable. 22
In 1994, the United States Congress entered the discussion of
zero tolerance in public schools by enacting the Gun Free Schools
Act (GFSA). 23 This law required all states receiving federal
education dollars to mandate expulsion for students who possessed
a weapon on school grounds. 24 GFSA defined “weapon” pursuant to
federal statute as a firearm, which by way of an explosive can
project an object. 25 Using a broader definition that included
individual gun parts as well as “any destructive device” gave
officials a wider net to cast on students. 26
GFSA mandated that students who possessed a firearm on
school grounds receive a minimum of a yearlong expulsion. 27 The
federal
law did include an exception,
allowing school
superintendents to modify in writing the expulsion requirement on
necessary to punish minor offense violators. Id.
21. See Skiba, supra note 16, at 3 n.1 (explaining that definitions of zero
tolerance differ slightly between studies, but the more common definitions
emphasize “punishing a range of behaviors, both major and minor, equally
severely.”). Unless otherwise noted in this comment, zero tolerance refers to the
punishment of students through removal from the classroom setting for
predetermined forbidden actions.
22. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975) (holding that students have
Due Process rights to notice and evidence of the charges against them before
being expelled from school).
23. Gun Free Schools Act, 20 U.S.C. § 8921 (1994), repealed by Gun Free
Schools Act (GFSA), 20 U.S.C. § 7151 (2002).
24. Id. Congress can require states to adopt policies that it wanted to
promote through conditional spending, made constitutional through South
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). Congre ss’s goal to eliminate guns from
campuses served the general welfare. Cf. id. at 208 (prohibiting persons under
age 21 served the general welfare). Congress gave states the option to continue
to accept federal funding for education in return for enforcing the eliminatio n
of guns on campuses. Cf. id. (noting that South Dakota accepted the federal
highway funds to improve its roads). Third, although education is primarily
thought of as a state interest, the federal government had an interest in
protecting students long enough for them to graduate and become active,
participating taxpayers. Cf. id. at 208–09 (admitting that safe interstate travel
is an important government interest). Finally, no “other constitutional
provision” existed to prevent Congress from conditioning its spending on states
adopting laws that expelled students for bringing guns to school. Cf. id. at 210
(“[T]he ‘independent constitutional bar’ limitation on the spending power is not
. . . a prohibition on the indirect achievement of objectives which Congress is not
empowered to achieve directly.”).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) (1996).
26. Id. The definition also included singular parts of a firearm: a student
could be expelled for possessing a gun frame, a receiver, a silencer or muffler,
or “any destructive device,” although the definition excluded antique firearms
from the list. Id.
27. GFSA, 20 U.S.C. § 7151(b)(1).
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a case-by-case basis. 28 Of course, the federal law only set the
baseline for punishing students. 29 By tying federal funding to the
adoption of zero tolerance policies, Congress wanted to strong-arm
states to take matters of school safety seriously. 30
For example, Illinois enacted its own version of the GFSA that
mandates expelling a student for at least one year but no more than
two if the school found the student in possession of a weapon. 31 But
where Congress somewhat limited its definition of “weapon” to
firearms, Illinois broadened the definition further to include “any
other object if used or attempted to be used to cause bodily harm.”32
Furthermore, the Illinois legislature expanded the scope of zero
tolerance to extend beyond school grounds and out to any event
“bear[ing] a reasonable relationship to school.” 33 The increase in
jurisdiction gave school officials a greater amount of control in their
fight against violence in schools. 34
Like our criminal justice system at large, the primary goal of
zero tolerance policies was deterrence. 35 Deterring violence and
disruptive outbursts can be an important part of maintaining
classroom order and safety, both of which are important goals in
educational environments. 36 Teachers could better focus on
teaching if predetermined student actions deemed detrimental to
the classroom had pre-established, standardized punishments. 37 By
28. Id.
29. See Muschert & Madfis, Fear of School Violence, supra note 7, at 26
(writing that states and school districts soon expanded the list of expellable
behavior).
30. 67B AM . JUR. 2D Schools § 384 (2015). Although courts have not typically
ruled this way, the amount of education funding the federal government
provides the states borders on the line where persuasion becomes compulsion,
and the principles of federalism are threatened. Cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602 (2012) (discussing funding-based compulsion in
the scope of Obamacare). Thus, whether states adopted zero tolerance policies
to deal with school discipline because it was a good idea is irrelevant; they did
not have a choice in the matter.
31. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-22.6(d) (West 1998).
32. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-22.6(d)(2).
33. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-22.6(d).
34. Mongan & Walker, supra note 18, at 233.
35. See id. at 238 (realizing that “deterrence is crucial to punishment
policies” yet finding that zero tolerance policies punish too randomly to act as
an effective deterrent for students).
36. Contra Kang-Brown et al., supra note 9, at 4 (finding zero tolerance
policies have no benefit on classroom discipline or school safety). In fact, some
studies show that zero tolerance policies might have negative effects on schools.
Id. Less than five percent of expulsions and suspensions nationally are handed
out because of weapons violations, but more than forty percent of punishments
address simple classroom disruptions. Id. Statistics such as these seem to run
counter to the intended goals of public education. That is, when students are
sent out of the classroom, they understandably cannot learn in the classroom.
37. See Alicia C. Insley, Comment, Suspending and Expelling Children from
Educational Opportunity: Time to Reevaluate Zero Tolerance Policies, 50 AM . U.
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the year 2000, every school district in the country raced to create
the toughest restrictions, hoping to avoid another Columbine-style
attack. 38
While the federal GFSA took the initiative in prohibiting
violence at schools by banning firearms, many states used it as a
rallying cry. 39 In an attempt to crack down on dangerous behavior
and prevent any and all violence at school, officials began punishing
students for actions having little or nothing to do with possessing
guns on campus. 40
In Illinois, the state legislature expanded the power of school
officials to expel and suspend students for “gross disobedience or
misconduct.”41 The legislature, however, failed to define what
constitutes gross disobedience or misconduct. 42 The broad or illdefined terms used by the legislature created a wide net that can
catch many students unaware. 43

L. REV . 1039, 1044–45 (determining that zero tolerance policies marked a shift
away from corporal punishment as a way to maintain classroom order).
38. Aviva M. Rich-Shea & James Alan Fox, Zero-Tolerance Policies, in
RESPONDING TO SCHOOL VIOLENCE : CONFRONTING THE COLUMBINE EFFECT 89,
90–91 (Glenn W. Muschert, et al. eds., 2014) [hereinafter Rich-Shea & Fox, ZT
Policies]. But cf. Donna Leinwand Leger, “Active Shooter” Incidents on the Rise,
USA TODAY (Sept. 25, 2014, 11:22 AM), www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation /
2014/09/24/active-shooter-incidents-rising-fbi-finds/16158921/
(finding that
despite the number of “active shooter” incidents increasing, the number of mass
shootings has not increased over the last eight years).
39. E.g., K Y. REV . STAT. ANN. § 158.150(1)(a) (West 2006) (adding “[w]illfu l
disobedience . . . use of profanity . . . or other incorrigible bad conduct” to the
list of offenses for which a student can be suspended or expelled); O HIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3313.534 (West 1998) (requiring school boards in each city to adopt
zero tolerance policies for “violent, disruptive, or inappropriate behavior,
including excessive truancy”); see also Insley, supra note 36, at 1047 n.46
(providing a comprehensive list of all fifty states’ adoption of laws matching or
based on the GFSA).
40. See Rich-Shea & Fox, ZT Policies, supra note 38, at 90–91 (expanding
prohibited weapons to include knives, nail files, and scissors; includin g
possession of drugs or alcohol; and adding fighting and even general
disobedience to the list of offenses for which a student could be suspended or
expelled). Overzealous school officials saw no end to the list of behaviors that
needed to be stamped out in order to preserve the learning environment.
41. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-22.6(a).
42. But see Whitfield v. Simpson, 312 F. Supp. 889, 897 (E.D. Ill. 1970)
(holding that a statute was not vague or overbroad for failing to define
“disobedience”). While the court decided this case prior to the Illinois legislature
passing the zero tolerance laws that this Comment discusses, the ruling still
shows that the court defers to the legislature when it comes to statutory
language in these instances. Further, Illinois was not the only state to add a
broad catch-all to its zero tolerance laws. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-210 (2001)
(allowing school officials to suspend students for “gross immorality, gross
misbehavior, persistent disobedience,” or for violating any other rules handed
down by the school board or the state).
43. See S. Carolina Student Arrested After Writing About Shooting a
Dinosaur, RT (Aug. 21, 2014, 11:16 PM), http://rt.com/usa/182004-gun-dinos au r
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When school officials apply these laws to student actions they
can often abridge the students’ due process rights. 44 The vast
amount of wiggle room in zero tolerance laws gave school officials
unilateral control over the students, making educational facilities
seem much more like prisons. 45 By outlawing otherwise normal
behavior and calling it disruptive, school officials have created an
environment where children are not students who are there to
learn, but are more like prisoners, ordered to obey. 46
Take, for example, Joshua Welch’s story. 47 He chewed his
breakfast pastry in such a way that he thought it looked like a gun.48
Joshua’s teacher believed that his strawberry breakfast tart posed
enough danger to the rest of the class to report him to the
principal. 49 His story highlights the extreme measures taken to
thwart suspected disruption.
Joshua’s story illustrates only the most ridiculous application
of zero tolerance policies against guns. 50 Since the passage of GFSA,
schools have punished students for pretending pencils were guns,51
suggesting a bubble battle, 52 and throwing imaginary grenades. 53
All of these cases overshoot the supposed purpose of the law:

-student-suspension-arrest/ (suspending a student for writing a short story
involving guns).
44. See Colquitt v. Rich Tp. High Sch. Dist. No. 227, 699 N.E.2d 1109, 1115
(Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (applying the due process standards of Goss v. Lopez to
lengthier punishments). The Supreme Court has said that students have a
property interest in the expectation of continuing education. Goss, 419 U.S. at
574. Some form of due process must be given before a student can be removed
for a significant amount of time that would threaten his or her right. Id. at 584.
45. See Rich-Shea & Fox, ZT Policies, supra note 38, at 103–04 (applyin g
zero tolerance and using school resource officers (SRO s) “varies inversely” with
traditional educational methods). SROs are police officers brought on to school
grounds to enforce the school’s zero tolerance policies. Id. at 93. Schools with
more stringent zero tolerance policies tend to employ the use of SROs more
liberally in enforcing those policies. Id. at 104.
46. Id. at 103.
47. Harris, supra note 2.
48. Id.
49. See St. George, supra note 1 (reporting that the assistant principal felt
the entire incident warranted a letter to each student’s parents explaining the
disruption and that the school has counselors available should any student want
one).
50. Cf. Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 611–12 (5th Cir.
2004) (punishing a student for two-year-old drawings “depicting the school
under a state of siege by a gasoline tanker truck, missile launcher, helicopter,
and various armed persons”).
51. Two Boys Suspended for Pointing Pencils Like Guns, RT (May 10, 2013,
8:16 PM), http://rt.com/usa/boys-pencil-gun-point-118/.
52. Alyssa Newcomb, Kindergartner Suspended Over Bubble Gun Threat,
ABC NEWS (Jan. 20, 2013, 12:45 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlin e s/
2013/01/kindergartner-suspended-over-bubble-gun-threat/.
53. Edelman, supra note 11.
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preventing gun possession on school grounds. 54 As a result, we are
left with school officials having a vast amount of control and
students having little to no understanding of what actions will merit
punishment. 55
Even after receiving a suspension or expulsion for an action, a
student’s problems may only get worse. 56 Schools will update a
student’s record to reflect any disciplinary actions against the
student, including expulsions, suspensions, and sometimes even
detentions. 57 The reason for the punishment often accompanies the
mark as well, and this file stays with a student for his or her entire
school career. 58 Increasingly, permanent marks against a student
stem from school officials applying zero tolerance policies to student
speech. 59

B. Restricted Speech in Schools
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech.”60 The Constitution makes it abundantly clear that the
ability to speak freely is highly valued and an essential part of a
functioning democracy. 61 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held
that students, simply for being students, do not “shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate.”62 But despite retaining the same rights as
everyone else, students are not exempt from restrictions on those
rights. 63
54. See 67B AM . JUR. 2D Schools § 384 (explaining that the act “encourages
states [to punish] pupils for possessing guns at school[s]”).
55. See American Psychological Association Zero Tolerance Task Force, Are
Zero Tolerance Policies Effective in the Schools?: An Evidentiary Review and
Recommendations, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 852, 854 (Dec. 2008), www.apa.org/
pubs/info/reports/zero-tolerance.pdf (determining that the deterrent effect zero
tolerance should produce likely creates more bad apples than prevents them).
56. See Mongan & Walker, supra note 18, at 234 (finding many students
could be stuck with a permanent black mark on their record that could follow
them for the rest of their life).
57. See Joe Burris, Arundel School Board Hears Case Involving Student
Suspended in Pastry Gun Incident, THE BALTIMORE SUN (Sept. 3, 2014),
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2014-09-03/news/bs-md-ar-pastry-kid-hearing
-20140903_1_pastry-gun-incident-school-system-b-j-welch
(reporting
that
attorney for Joshua Welch wants the boy’s record expunged of the suspe nsion).
58. See St. George, supra note 1 (quoting Joshua Welch’s father’s worry that
his son could be denied a job requiring security clearance because of the negative
mark against him in second grade).
59. See generally Lynda Hils, “Zero Tolerance” for Free Speech, 30 J. L. &
EDUC. 365 (2001) (arguing that in an effort to prevent school violence before it
begins, administrators are punishing student speech).
60. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
61. Id.
62. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
63. See id. at 507 (indicating that schools must balance students’ freedom of
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The United States Supreme Court created the preeminent
standard for student speech in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District.64 In December 1965, three students
decided to wear black armbands to school as a form of protest
against the Vietnam War. 65 The students’ school district learned of
the plan ahead of time and created a policy forbidding such an
action. 66 In spite of the restriction, John and Mary Beth Tinker and
their friend Christopher Eckhardt proceeded with their plan on
December 16. 67 The school suspended the students for violating its
policy, and the students appealed all the way to the Suprem e
Court. 68 The Court established that the First Amendment protects
student speech, as long as it does not “materially disrupt[]
classwork or involve[] . . . invasion of the rights of others.” 69
Where some find a disruption, however, others may find
nothing more than unpopular opinion. 70 Locating the balance
between protected and unprotected speech in schools requires
drawing a very difficult line between speech and disruption. 71 In
subsequent decisions, the Court clarified its Tinker standard by
allowing schools to prohibit speech that interferes with the
education of other students. 72
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, a case dealing with a
lewd student government stump speech, saw the Court expand
Tinker, authorizing schools to censor “offensive” speech. 73 The major
speech rights with safeguarding the school).
64. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 (holding that the First Amendment does not
protect a student’s conduct that “for any reason . . . materially disrupts
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others”).
65. Id. at 504.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 504–05.
69. Id. at 513.
70. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 434 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71. Compare Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 (wearing armbands in support of
protesting the Vietnam War did not disrupt school), with Blackwell v. Issaquena
County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966) (compelling other students to
wear freedom buttons was a disruption).
72. E.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986)
(permitting “vulgar and lewd speech . . . would undermine the school’s basic
educational mission”); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271
(holding that educators have an increased level of control in restricting speech
in school-sponsored activities and events).
73. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683. While Fraser dealt with lewd or obscene speech,
and thus, falls outside the scope of this Comment, parallels can be drawn
between the ban on obscene speech and the prohibition on violent or
suggestively pro-gun speech. As Chief Justice Burger writes for the majority,
“the fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political
system disfavor the use of terms of debate highly offensive or highly threatening
to others.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Following this logic, if the mention
of guns offends even one person, it has no place in public discourse. But see
Morse, 551 U.S. at 409 (emphasizing that a blanket definition of “offensive”
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takeaway from Fraser was that although students enjoy free speech
protection, their rights still fall short of adults’. 74 Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlmeier reiterated that schools could censor speech
“inconsistent with its ‘basic educational mission.’” 75 The Court also
broadened a school’s reach in prohibiting student speech to any
school-sponsored activity, event, or assignment. 76
The Supreme Court in Tinker realized that certain student
speech could be unpopular, but that it should also receive protection
because the classroom uniquely represents the “marketplace of
ideas.”77 Simply because some may find a student’s speech offensive
does not make it unprotected in school. 78 Schools may not prohibit
student speech unless it inhibits the ability to promote safety and
education in the classroom. 79
To make matters even more complicated, the standard only
requires that school authorities have the reasonable belief that a
student’s actions or conduct will materially disrupt the classroom. 80
This subtle interpretation allows teachers and administrators to
preemptively punish kids the moment they fear a disruption, rather
than wait for the disruption to occur and then pass judgment. 81 In
some cases, a teacher’s mere belief that a student will cause a
disruption looks far less reasonable. 82 In other instances, a student’s
grants schools too much power).
74. Id. at 682.
75. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 266 (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685).
76. Id. at 271. As publisher of a school paper, schools do not only have the
power to prohibit materially disruptive speech, but also to forbid speech that is
“ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced,
vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for immature audiences.” Id. The Court left to
a school’s discretion the ability to refuse to disseminate work that might
“associate the school with any position other than neutrality on matters of
political controversy.” Id. at 272. In today’s highly politicized society, such
blanket authority can easily lead to stifling less politically popular opinions.
77. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512.
78. Morse, 551 U.S. at 409.
79. See id. at 410 (finding that student Frederick’s speech was not protected
because it “promot[ed] illegal drug use”). Based on public opinion and the
billions of dollars spent on anti-drug campaigns, many people feel that schools
have a duty to prohibit drug use by students. Id. at 408. Stamping out speech
that tends to promote drug use falls within the confines of that duty. Id. School
authorities have likewise extended the principles of GFSA in preventing
firearms from coming on to campus to apply to any language promoting guns.
80. Brown ex rel. Brown v. Cabell County Bd. of Educ., 714 F. Supp. 2d 587,
596 (S.D. W. Va. 2010).
81. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 401 (holding that a school principal was justifie d
in confiscating a banner saying “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” because it could be
interpreted as promoting illegal drug use and cause a disruption among
students).
82. Compare Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. #204, 523 F.3d
668, 674 (7th Cir. 2011) (reasoning that the thought “that a particular type of
student speech will lead to a decline in students' test scores, an upsurge in
truancy, or other symptoms of a sick school” is sufficient to proscribe school
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actions or potential actions warrant proactive discipline in order to
maintain safety and decorum. 83
Fears of mass shootings at schools plague the national
conscience and influence the minds of those charged with overseeing
students. 84 Students in a public school setting comprise a captive
audience, adding another dangerous layer to the possibility of
violence on school grounds. 85 School authorities, therefore, take very
seriously anything seen as a threat to the safety of students,
teachers, or the school in general. 86

C. True Threats Analysis by the Courts
While the First Amendment provides many protections over a
person’s speech, it does not protect a person who makes threats. 87
But determining whether a statement or action constitutes a threat
proves to be a difficult task. 88 Courts have split on whether to apply
an objective test—either the objective speaker or reasonable
recipient—or the subjective-intent test to a person’s statement or
action. 89
speech), with B.H. v. Easton Area Sch. Dist., 827 F. Supp. 2d 392, 408-09 (E.D.
Pa. 2011) (holding that wearing “I <3 BOOBIES” bracelets would not cause a
substantial disruption, and thus, could not be banned), and Eugene Volokh,
High School Student Suspended for Refusing to Remove NRA T-Shirt, WASH.
POST (Mar. 13, 2014) www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/
2014/03/13/high-school-stu dent-su spen ded-for-refusing-to-remove-nra-t-sh irt/
(suspending student for refusing to remove his NRA t-shirt likely violated his
First Amendment rights).
83. E.g., Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 766 (5th Cir. 2007)
(holding that a student’s journal entries describing a Columbine -style attack
posed a threat to school safety and warranted suspension).
84. See Lovell ex rel. Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 374
(9th Cir. 1996) (holding that because school violence is prevalent, a reasonable
person could interpret a student’s statement as a threat).
85. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 515 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citing his
concurrence in Ginsberg v. State of N.Y., 390 U.S. 629, 649–50 (1968)
(permitting states to restrict the rights of minors because they do not have the
full capacity that adults possess).
86. Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 633 (8th Cir.
2002) (en banc).
87. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (finding constitutional
a statute which criminalized threats against the President); see also Virginia v.
Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (holding true threats to be “statements where
the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit
an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group”).
88. Salgado, supra note 10, at 1387–88. Speech that qualifies as venting or
blowing off steam does not rise to the level of true threats. Id. at 1386.
Responding to being drafted, Robert Watts exclaimed, “If they ever make me
carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.” Watts, 394 U.S.
at 706. The Court found Watts’s speech to be “political hyperbole,” and thus,
outside the scope of the statute under which he was prosecuted. Id. at 708.
89. Nine Circuit Courts of Appeals have held that an objective test applie s
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The objective test considers the speaker’s statements or
conduct from the perspective of an objective listener. 90 The test asks
whether a reasonable person would hear or see the words and fear
an act of violence. 91 This test places the onus on proving only
whether the speaker intended to communicate a threatening
message; intent to carry out the threat is not considered. 92 The
objective speaker test protects individuals from the fear of violence
or the disruption that such a fear could cause. 93
The subjective-intent test focuses on whether the speaker
actually intends to cause fear in another; the emphasis rests solely
on the speaker. 94 This test comports with the general principle that
the First Amendment serves to protect a person’s right to speak. 95
However, the subjective-intent test has gained little traction with
the courts. 96

in true threats cases. See United States v. Francis, 164 F.3d 120, 123 (2d Cir.
1999) (holding that the government only need prove transmission of a message
a reasonable recipient could interpret as a threat is sufficient); United States v.
Whiffen, 121 F.3d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that the objective standard
protects speakers from “an unusually sensitive listener” and protects listen ers
if the threats reasonably resemble threats); United States v. Myers, 104 F.3d
76, 80–81 (5th Cir. 1997) (declining to hold that the law against threatening
communications requires specific intent); United States v. Darby, 37 F.3d 1059,
1066 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding an intent to transmit is sufficient); United States
v. DeAndino, 958 F.2d 146, 148 (6th Cir. 1992) (overruling the district court that
18 U.S.C. § 875(c) requires specific intent), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1206, 112 S.
Ct. 2997 (1992); United States v. Manning, 923 F.2d 83, 86 (8th Cir. 1991)
(holding that the making of the threat is most important, followed by protecting
the “recipient’s sense of personal safety”); United States v. Schneider, 910 F.2d
1569, 1570–71 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying a reasonable recipient test to determine
that the defendant intended to threaten “public serpents”); United States v.
Callahan, 702 F.2d 964, 965–66 (11th Cir. 1983) (focusing on the defendant’s
intentional transmission of the message that a reasonable perso n would
consider it a threat); United States v. Hart, 457 F.2d 1087, 1091 (10th Cir. 1972)
(affirming the lower court’s instructions to the jury that it must “find that the
maker had an apparent determination to carry out the threat” (internal
quotations omitted)). Only the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applies the
subjective-intent standard. See United States v. Twine, 853 F.2d 676, 680–81
(9th Cir. 1988) (finding that threats prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) require
a showing of specific intent).
90. Salgado, supra note 10, at 1388. Contra the objective speaker test, which
considers the statements from the perspective of “a reasonable person standing
in the shoes of the speaker.” Id.
91. Andrew P. Stanner, Toward an Improved True Threat Doctrine for
Student Speakers, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV . 385, 410 (2006).
92. Manning, 923 F.2d at 86; Callahan, 702 F.2d at 966.
93. Whiffen, 121 F.3d at 21; Manning, 923 F.2d at 86.
94. Stanner, supra note 91, at 410.
95. See id. at 411 (arguing that adding a mens rea element to the test would
require genuine proof of an intent to threaten before speech could be punished).
96. United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 329 (3d Cir. 2013) (interpreting
the Court’s ruling in Virginia v. Black to require only an intent to communicate
a threat, not the intent to threaten), rev’d on other grounds, 135 S. Ct. 2001
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III. THE PROBLEM WITH “SAFETY” OVER SPEECH
Students must now attempt to navigate the quagmire created
by the combination of zero tolerance policies and tightening
restrictions on interpreting student speech. Part III.A explores the
failures in protecting student speech brought on by zero tolerance
policies. Part III.B shows why the true threats test most often used
by the courts exacerbates the problem. Part III.C examines the data
surrounding school violence to show that zero tolerance policies act
as a solution in search of a problem.

A. Zero Tolerance Leads to Over-Inclusion and
Excessive Punishments
Since the mid-1990s when zero tolerance for weapons in
schools became the norm throughout the United States, school
administrators have pushed the boundaries for what qualifies as a
violation. 97 Federal law makes clear that possession of a firearm is
the only requirement for expelling a student for a minimum of one
year. 98 State laws, such as Illinois’s, have expanded the list of
weapons to include anything that could be “used or attempted to be
used to cause bodily harm.”99 Ignoring that such a broad definition
would leave classrooms bare of teaching materials, 100 these zero
tolerance policies end up targeting actions having nothing to do with
actual weapons possession. 101
Joshua Welch’s story about receiving a suspension for his poptart pistol adds one more link to the chain of countless abuses of

(2015). The Court punted on the First Amendment issue and instead remanded
the case because the parties had not addressed whether recklessness fulfills the
mens rea requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2012.
97. See Skiba, supra note 16, at 3–4 (citing instances of schools punishing
students by classifying everything from a squirt gun or a homemade rocket to
nail clippers and a toy plastic ax as a weapon).
98. GFSA, 20 U.S.C. § 7151(b)(1).
99. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-22.6(d)(2).
100. See Kate Linthicum, Student Uses Pencil to Repeatedly Stab Sant a
Rosa Teacher, Police Say, LA TIMES (Nov. 21, 2013), http://articles.latimes.co m /
2013/nov/21/local/la-me-ln-santa-rosa-teacher-stabbed-20131121 (reporting that
student stabbed a teacher multiple times using his pencil). The reality is that
anything can be used in a manner that could cause bodily harm to another,
which makes the language in the Illinois statute extremely overbroad. See
Russell Anglin, Student Hit Teacher with Textbook, Spearman Police Say ,
AMARILLO G LOBE -NEWS (Aug. 30, 2012, 9:22 PM), http://amarillo.com/new s/
local-news/2012-08-30/police-student-hit- teacher-textbook (reporting that a
student hit his teacher in the face with a textbook).
101. See Kang-Brown et al., supra note 9, at 4 (citing studies showing that
no more than five percent of expulsions and suspensions are because of weapons
possession).
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zero tolerance quelling student speech. 102 All over the country,
students like Joshua have fallen on the wrong side of zero tolerance
policies, often for innocuous or otherwise childlike behavior. 103
In May 2014, eight-year-old Kody Smith’s teacher told him to
watch the clouds and draw whatever shapes he thought he saw. 104
Feeling inspired by the distribution of cirrus, cumulus and stratus
clouds above him, Kody drew a gun. 105 His teacher filed a behavior
report against Kody because she deemed his drawing “disruptive to
the learning community.”106
In early 2013, Alex Evans, a seven-year-old boy in Colorado,
played a make-believe game of “rescue the world” during recess one
day. 107 The game, as one might imagine, involved saving the world
from the forces of evil. In order to accomplish this lofty goal, young
Alex threw an imaginary grenade—that is, he physically threw
nothing—“into a box with pretend evil forces inside.” 108
Unfortunately for Alex, his school had a list of “absolutes” designed
to ensure school safety. 109 The list states that the school will tolerate

102. Burris, Pastry Gun, supra note 5.
103. See Cuevas, supra note 11 (reporting that a ten-year-old boy was
suspended for pointing his fingers in the shape of a gun at another student and
saying “BOOM”); Two Boys Suspended for Pointing Pencils Like Guns, supra
note 51 (reporting two elementary students were suspended for pointing pencils
at each other and “making gun noises”); Chris Eger, 5-Year-Old With Loaded
Crayon Made To Sign Suicide Contract (VIDEO), G UNS .COM (Oct. 11, 2014),
www.guns.com/2014/10/11/5-year-old-with-loaded-crayon-made-to-sign-suicide
-contract-video/ (reporting that a five-year-old girl was forced to sign a “safety
contract” after pointing a crayon at another student and saying “pew -pew”)
(video no longer exists). It is absurd that students are being punished for
pointing fingers and writing utensils at each other. The entire scenario is so
divorced from reality that holding these students to the same standards as
someone who brings an actual firearm to school lacks all common sense. After
all, everyone knows guns “[don’t] go ‘pkew-pkew’; [they] go ‘bang-bang-bang!’”
South Park: Lil’ Crime Stoppers (Braniff Productions Apr. 23, 2003).
104. Kristin Haubrich, Gun Picture Gets Boy In Trouble, KKTV.COM (May
21, 2014, 1:39 PM), www.kktv.com/home/headlines/Gun-Picture-Gets-Boy-inTrouble-260059701.html.
105. See id. (imagining the clouds looked like a gun, Kody drew a gun).
106. Eric Owens, Teacher Asks Second Graders To Draw What They See In
Clouds, Boy Sees Gun, Teacher WRITES UP BOY, DAILYCALLER.COM (May 24,
2014, 7:25 AM), http://dailycaller.com/2014/05/24/teacher-asks-second-grade rsto-draw-what-they-see-in-clouds-boy-sees-gun-teacher-writes-up-boy/.
107. Edelman, supra note 11.
108. David Mitchell & Julie Hayden, 7-Year-Old Playing an Imaginary
Game at School Gets Suspended For Real, KDVR.COM (Feb. 4, 2013, 9:55 PM),
http://kdvr.com/2013/02/04/7-year-old-playing-an-imaginary-game-at-school-gets
-suspended-for-real/.
109. ABSOLUTES for Mary Blair Elementary, http://kdvr.com/2013/02/04/7
-year-old-playing-an-imaginary-game-at-school-gets-suspende d-for-real/ (follow
‘Click here to see the Mary Blair “Absolutes”’ hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 24,
2016) [hereinafter ABSOLUTES].
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“absolutely no fighting, real or imaginary.” 110 Alex’s school
maintains that it did not suspend him “for having an imaginary
weapon,” but the young boy’s story—that it was all make-believe—
remained consistent each time he was asked. 111
Rhett Parham drew a cartoon bomb—the archetypal cartoon
bomb found in Wile E. Coyote and The Roadrunner cartoons—based
on one of his favorite video games, Bomberman 64.112 An autistic
student, Rhett took his drawing to school to show his classmates. 113

110. Mitchell & Hayden, supra note 108. The Mary Blair Elementary’s
“Absolutes” provided to KDVR is listed below:
To insure this Time to Teach Program, we have come up with some
ABSOLUTES to make Mary Blair a safe environment.
The ABSOLUTES for Mary Blair Elementary:
1. No Physical Abuse or Fights—real or “play fighting”
2. No weapons (real or play), illegal drugs (including tobacco) or
alcohol
3. No serious disrespect toward people or property (includes, but is
not limited: profanity, racial slurs, deliberately refusing to follow a
staff directive, graffiti, etc.)
ABSOLUTE Procedure:
• An ABSOLUTE must be witnessed by an adult
• A student will be placed in the Principal’s office or sent home for
the rest of the day if he/she violates an ABSOLUTE. A student will
be allowed two non-severe, non-suspension occurrences. The third
occurrence will constitute a formal suspension, which co uld be up
to five school days. A conference is always held with the teacher and
the principal as to the severity of the consequence.
• Each time a student violates and ABSOLUTE, a “Parent
Notification of Behavior Problem” form will be sent home with the
child.
• Each time a student is suspended, a “Behavioral Plan” will be
written with parents, principal, teacher and the student (when
possible). This conforms to Thompson R2J School District policy
and Colorado Discipline Code.
• Every ABSOLUTE that is broken following the first suspension
will also be a suspension.
ABSOLUTES, supra note 109.
111. Jessica Maher, Loveland Schools Now Guarded About Reason for
Suspension, REPORTERHERALD.COM (Feb. 7, 2013, 6:01 PM), www.reporterher
ald.com/ci_22535410/lovelan d-schools-now-guarded-about-reason-suspension.
112. Derek Dellinger & Cody Alcorn, Suspension of SC Autistic Student Who
Drew Bomb Lifted, FOXCAROLINA. COM (Nov. 13, 2013, 2:25 PM), www.foxca
rolina.com/story/23690052/mother-special-needs-son-suspended-for-picture-ofbomb. Bomberman 64 is a video game in which the main character “must collect
bombs and power-ups” in order to save his world. Doug Perry, Bomberman 64,
IGN (Dec. 2, 1997), www.ign.com/articles/1997/12/03/bomberman-64. The
protagonist uses bombs to complete puzzles and mazes in order to beat eac h
individual level or boss character. Id.
113. Id.
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Some of his older classmates reported the drawing to school
administrators, and the school suspended Rhett. 114 While the school
district eventually lifted Rhett’s suspension, it insisted that it
“acted in accord with applicable laws, policies and procedures.” 115
In October 2013, a Scottsdale, Arizona school threatened to
punish an eight-year-old boy “for drawing highly disturbing
pictures.”116 The boy’s drawings consisted of a soldier with a rifle
strapped to his back, a ninja holding a scoped rifle, and a Star Wars
character wielding dual pistols: his possible Halloween costumes. 117
The school board’s policy permitted expulsion for “[a]ny behavior
that is deemed threatening such as . . . drawings depicting
weapons.”118
Perhaps most egregious of all is the 2012 story out of Nebraska
about Hunter Spanjer, a three-year-old deaf boy who communicates
using the Signing Exact English Standard. 119 In order to sign his
name, he “crosses his index and middle fingers and waves them
slightly.”120 However, because the way he signs his name resembled
a gun, his school told his family he would need to find a new way to
convey his name. 121 The local school board’s weapons policy
prohibits “any instrument . . . that is a firearm, weapon, or looks
like a weapon.”122
A common theme runs through all of these examples: acting
within the laws and policies in place, school officials crack down on
normal childhood behaviors—like drawing pictures or playing on
the playground—under the guise of preventing school violence. But
criminalizing innocent actions conditions developing children into
“expect[ing] that adult life portends restricted accesses, security,
114. Drawing of Cartoon Bomb Gets Special-Needs Student Suspended,
FOXNEWS .COM (Oct. 16, 2013), www.foxnews.com/us/2013/10/16/drawin g cartoon-bomb-gets-special-needs-student-suspended/.
115. Dellinger & Alcorn, supra note 112.
116. Rebecca Thomas, 8-Year-Old Threatened with Expulsion for Drawings,
KPHO.COM (Nov. 14, 2013, 11:17 PM), www.kpho.com/story/23847600/8-year old-threatened-with-expulsion-for-drawings.
117. Id.
118. Scottsdale Country Day School Student and Parent Handbook 2013 –
2014, at 5, www.scdsaz.com/ParentHandbook.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2016).
119. Ron Dicker, Hunter Spanjer, 3-Year-Old Deaf Boy, Told by Preschool to
Change Way He Signs His Name (VIDEO), HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 28, 2012,
12:25 PM), www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/28/hunter-spanjer-3-year-old_ n _
1836159.html (video no longer available).
120. Id.
121. Philip Caulfield, Family: Nebraska School Says Our Deaf 3-Year-Old’s
Sign-Language Gesture for His Own Name Looks Like ‘Weapons,’ Must Change,
NY DAILY NEWS (Aug. 28, 2012, 9:56 AM), www.nydailynews.com/news/nat
ional/nebraska-school-3-year-old-deaf-boy-sign-language-gesture-guns-changevideo-article-1.1146024.
122. Grand Island Public Schools § 8470, Weapons in Schools, www.gips.org/
about-gips/policies/section-8000-students/8470-%E2%80%93-weapons-in-school.
html.
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and control.”123 Such defeatist attitudes about life hardly conform to
the goals of American public education. 124 But as long as schools
have broad discretion in whom to punish and for what actions, these
narratives will persist. 125
There is no doubt that firearms are a part of American history
and tradition. 126 When it comes to guns and schools, however,
legislators and school administrators would rather bury their heads
in the sand than responsibly discuss the topic with students. The
GFSA and similar legislation stretch the words school safety so that
they lose all meaning. 127 By equating Pop-tart pistols and finger
guns with actual gun possession, school administrators continue to
punish student speech while becoming desensitized to more obvious
cries for help. 128

B. No Help from the Courts—The True Threat Test
Is Too Demanding
In the instances where schools do not soon cave to public
pressures over excessive punishments, students can still have
trouble finding relief through the courts. 129 Rather than stand as
123. Daniel Hillyard & M. Joan McDermott, Ecological, Peacemaking, and
Feminist Considerations, in RESPONDING TO SCHOOL VIOLENCE : CONFRONTI NG
THE COLUMBINE EFFECT 173, 176 (Glenn W. Muschert, et al. eds., 2014)
[hereinafter Hillyard & McDermott, Considerations].
124. See Mission Statement, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., www2.ed.gov/about/overview
/mission/mission.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2014) (stating the U.S. Department
of Education’s mission as “promot[ing] student achievement and preparation for
global competitiveness”).
125. See Hillyard & McDermott, Considerations, supra note 123, at 178
(arguing that well-meaning policies designed to prevent harm sweep up too
many innocent individuals).
126. U.S. CONST. amend. II; McDonald v. City of Chi., Ill., 561 U.S. 742, 768
(2010). In deciding whether the Second Amendment applies to local
governments, the Court heavily explored the history behind the right to keep
and bear arms. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767–69.
127. Cf. Greg Lukianoff, Freedom From Speech, in ENCOUNTER BROADSID E
NO. 39, 40 (Encounter Books, 2014) (arguing that college campuses “water[]
down” the term safety by “conflat[ing] it with comfort or even reassurance.”).
128. Greg Lukianoff sums up the problem nicely:
Our society appears to have forgotten the moral of the fable ‘The Boy
Who Cried Wolf.’ When there is confusion as to whether safety refers to
physical harm or to mere discomfort, how can professors and
administrators quickly assess the danger of a situation and make
appropriate decisions to safeguard the physical security of their
students?
Id. at 40–41.
129. See, e.g., Cox v. Warwick Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 267, 274 (2d
Cir. 2011) (finding the principal’s actions in removing a student who wrote
about his last hours on earth ending in suicide warranted “unusual deference”);
Ponce, 508 F.3d at 772 (finding student’s speech threatening, and therefore,
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the last bastion of student speech, courts instead offer school
administrators wide deference in punishing students, citing “a wellknown pattern of . . . mass, systematic school-shootings” as the
reason. 130 But, as Part III.C will address, that argument is not an
accurate assessment of the current school environment. 131
A large part of the problem comes from how courts determine
the nature of a student’s actions. 132 Whether the courts use the
objective speaker or the reasonable recipient test, neither accounts
for the student’s intent when speaking. 133
The objective speaker test puts the reasonable person in the
speaker’s shoes to determine if another person could feel threatened
by the speech. 134 Using this test, the judge or juror would assume
the role of Joshua Welch to determine if he should foresee another
student feeling threatened when facing a pistol made of dough and
strawberry filling. While the reasonable person should consider the
contextual facts surrounding the speech, 135 an adult judge or juror
will not have the same perspective as a student. 136 A student
speaker would have less experience with knowing what type of
speech could cause the recipient to feel fear. Or, more generally,
adult judges and jurors might find more threats in particular speech
than a child would.
Therefore, the objective speaker test fails to protect student
speech because it requires placing an adult in the shoes of a kid,
who often times might not fully know what he or she is doing. 137 The

unprotected).
130. Ponce, 508 F.3d at 771.
131. See discussion infra Part III.C.
132. See Fiona Ruthven, Is the True Threat the Student or the School Board?
Punishing Threatening Student Expression, 88 IOWA L. REV . 931, 944 (2003)
(comparing the objective speaker test and the reasonable recipient test that
courts often use in evaluating student speech for true threats).
133. See Stanner, supra note 91, at 410 (arguing that scholars have criticize d
the objective tests for years because of the lack of mens rea).
134. Lovell, 90 F.3d at 372.
135. Id. (quoting United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th
Cir. 1990)).
136. See, e.g., Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494
F.3d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating that a student sent an instant message
picture to fifteen friends, none of whom seemed to find the picture threatening,
before his teacher eventually found out about it and became worried).
137. See Dellinger & Alcorn, supra note 112 (reporting that an autistic boy
was suspended after showing a drawing of a cartoon bomb to classmates). Swiss
psychologist Jean Piaget determined that children’s development is closely tied
to their maturation. VAL BROOKS , IAN ABBOTT & PRUE HUDDLESTON,
PREPARING TO TEACH IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS : A STUDENT TEACHER'S G UIDE TO
PROFESSIONAL ISSUES IN SECONDARY EDUCATION 44 (McGraw-Hill Education,
2012). As they mature, children must pass through multiple stages of cognitive
development that steadily provides the basis for “a logical and systematic way of
thinking.” Id. at 45. Until at least adolescence, children do not develop the ability
to reason abstractly. Id. But even after reaching adolescence, children tend to
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objective speaker test places the onus on the student to understand
and recognize when his or her speech could be taken as
threatening. 138 This standard could be difficult for students to
comprehend, though, and without a full understanding, they may
choose not to speak at all. 139 Alternatively, public awareness of an
onerous policy could result in even more disruptive speech. 140
Unfortunately, the reasonable recipient test places even more
responsibility on students to control their speech. 141 The go-to
standard for the reasonable recipient test in student speech is Doe
v. Pulaski County Special School District. 142 Citing its decision in
United States v. Dinwiddie,143 the Eighth Circuit in Doe puts the
reasonable person in the shoes of the speech recipient to determine
its threatening nature. 144 While the Court in Doe stated that
“[m]ost, if not all thirteen-year-old girls would be frightened by the
message,” it took for granted that the recipient would even receive
the message. 145 The reasonable recipient test stifles speech because
the focus is on transmission of the message rather than the actual
speech. 146
“assume that everyone else shares their concerns.” Id.
138. Ruthven, supra note 132, at 944.
139. See Liz Klimas, Texas Dad Not Happy After He Says School Slapped
His Son With In-School Suspension for Wearing This ‘Intolerable’ T -Shirt,
THE BLAZE .COM (Oct. 23, 2013, 5:28 PM), www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/10/
23/father-claims-god-guns-country-t-shirt-landed-his-son-in-school-suspension/
(reporting that after wearing to school a shirt depicting guns, the student was
told “he would face increasing punishments” if he wore it again).
140. See Nona Willis Aronowitz, School Spirit or Gang Signs? “Zero
Tolerance” Comes Under Fire, NBC NEWS (Mar. 9, 2014, 8:41 AM), www.
nbcnews.com/news/education/school-spirit-or-gang-signs-zero-tolerance-comesunder-fire-n41431 (reporting that after a fifteen-year-old boy was suspended for
allegedly flashing a gang sign, the boy’s brother and twenty other students were
suspended for showing the same symbol in solidarity). Dontadrian Bruce held
up his thumb, forefinger, and middle finger to signify the number 3—his football
jersey number—in a picture. The assistant principal suspended the boy because
the sign resembled that of the Vice Lords, a Chicago-based gang. Id.
141. See Ruthven, supra note 132, at 962 (arguing that too loose an
application of the reasonable recipient test gives administrators even wider
breadth to punish student speech as threatening).
142. Doe, 306 F.3d 616. After an intense breakup with K.G., J.M. wrote two
letters reflecting the style of rappers Eminem, Juvenile, and Kid Rock. Id. at
619. The letters contained a string of expletives, and J.M. expressed a desire to
“sodomize, rape, and kill K.G.” Id. at 625. While staying the night at J.M.’s
house, D.M., a mutual friend of both, swiped one of the letters unbeknownst to
J.M. and delivered it to K.G. The students’ school subsequently investigated and
expelled J.M. Id. at 619–20.
143. United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 1996).
144. Doe, 306 F.3d at 622.
145. See id. at 625 (finding that although “J.M. did not personally deliver
the letter to K.G. [that] did not dispel its threatening nature.”).
146. Compare Doe, 306 F.3d at 624 (finding that even though D.M. stole the
letter to deliver to K.G., J.M. intended to communicate the message by telling
D.M. about the letter’s existence); with Porter, 393 F.3d at 617 (finding that
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Using the reasonable recipient test, a juror would place him or
herself in the shoes of Joshua Welch’s teacher or second grade
classmates. The reasonable recipient test requires a student
speaker to anticipate all listeners’ potential reactions. 147 A student
cannot know how a teacher’s reaction will differ from a fellow
student’s, or how both may differ from the vice principal’ s
response. 148 Such broad deference to the listener often leads to
courts upholding the school’s punishment. 149 Courts grant this
additional deference to schools when evaluating student speech
because they mistakenly perceive school violence as an epidemic. 150

C. The Myth of the School Violence “Epidemic”
Joshua Welch’s case is not the first time that a school has
severely punished a student for having an overactive
imagination. 151 For the last two decades, schools have been cracking
down on perceived threats of violence with uniform punishments
meant for more serious threats. 152 State and local governments have
combined zero tolerance for guns with zero tolerance for disruptive
behavior to create an almost impossible maze for students to
navigate. 153 Add to that mix the over-sensationalized idea that an
epidemic of school shootings and mass killings exists in the United

Adam Porter did not intend to communicate a threat because he showed the
picture only to a few people in his home two years before it “serendipitously
reached the EAHS campus”).
147. For what exactly is a reasonable listener? Everyone’s perspective
differs, and one student’s threat is another student’s rap lyric, which in turn
could be another student blowing off steam. See Doe, 306 F.3d at 631 (noting
that student thought channeling rapper Eminem would be the best way to
express himself); Jones v. State, 347 Ark. 409, 414 (2002) (quoting the student
as telling principal and police officer that he modeled his writing after Eminem).
148. See Stanner, supra note 91, at 411 (arguing that “a reasonable person
and a reasonable adolescent might have very different ideas about what
constitutes a true threat.”).
149. E.g., Riehm v. Engelking, 538 F.3d 952, 964 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding it
reasonable that a student’s creative writing teacher would feel threatened by
the student’s essay); Ponce, 508 F.3d at 771 (finding student’s speech
threatening because it involved a possible attack on a school).
150. See Ponce, 508 F.3d at 771 (citing America’s “recent history [of attacks
in schools]” as a sufficient justification for punishing all alleged threats); see
generally Morse, 551 U.S. at 408 (finding the danger of promoting illegal drug
use to be sufficient justification of proscribing student speech).
151. See discussion supra Part III.A.
152. See Mongan & Walker, supra note 18, at 233 (mandating zero tolerance
policies in schools in 1994 with the passage of the GFSA and continuing since).
153. See generally Kang-Brown et al., supra note 9, at 2–3 (increasing the
number of zero tolerance infractions has led to a surge in the number of
suspensions and expulsions in schools). A vast majority of the suspensions
handed out have nothing to do with weapon possession. Id. at 4.
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States. 154 Subsequently, any mention or indication of guns or
violence receives immediate attention and usually the harshest
penalties. 155
Even though the number of school shootings remains low, 156
schools and legislators across the country have been subscribing to
something known as the Columbine Effect for nearly twenty
years. 157 On April 20, 1999, two Colorado students carried out one
of the deadliest attacks at a school in United States history. 158 With
twelve students and a teacher killed in the attack, the Columbine
shootings shot to the forefront of social commentary the idea that
American schools are rife with violence. 159
The heightened media attention of this isolated event gave the
American public a semi-identifiable bogeyman to vanquish. 160 The
American public demanded answers for school shootings. 161 The
public clamored for stricter punishments for any perceived threats;
thus, the zero tolerance policies from the early 1990s gained new
popularity. 162
154. See Paul Bedard, Crime Study: Handguns, Not “Assault Rifles,” Used
in Most Mass Shootings, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://wash i
ngtonexaminer.com/crime-study-no-rise-in-mass-shootings-despite-media-hype
/article/2542118 (reporting that despite increased attention from the media, the
number of mass shootings has stayed around twenty per year over the last
thirty-four years).
155. See Alan Wang, SF Student Suspended Over Connecticut Poem,
ABC7NEWS .COM (Dec. 27, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://abc7news.com/archive /
8934233/ (writing a poem about the school shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary
gets a girl suspended).
156. See ROBERS , ET AL., INDICATORS , supra note 13, at 6 (finding that less
than two percent of all school-age youth homicides (children aged 5–18) occurred
at school); see also MARY ELLEN O’TOOLE , FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, THE
SCHOOL SHOOTER: A THREAT ASSESSMENT PERSPECTIVE 4 (2000) (correcting
common misconceptions that school shootings are an epidemic).
157. See generally RESPONDING TO SCHOOL VIOLENCE : CONFRONTING THE
COLUMBINE EFFECT, (Glenn Muschert, Stuart Henry, Nicole Bracy, Anthony
Peguero, eds., 2014) (defining Columbine Effect as the build-up of policies based
on fear of school shootings). On April 20, 1999, two Columbine High School
students in Littleton, Colorado, shot thirty-four people at school, killing
thirteen. Columbine High School Shootings Fast Facts, CNN.COM , www.cnn.
com/2013/09/18/us/columbine-high-school-shootings-fast-facts/ (updated May 6,
2015, 12:11 PM).
158. Columbine High School Shootings Fast Facts, supra note 157.
159. See Glenn W. Muschert, The Columbine Victims and the Myth of the
Juvenile Superpredator, 5 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUVENILE JUST. 351, 351 (2007)
[hereinafter Muschert, Myth of the Juvenile Superpredator] (explaining that the
media blasted the story into the living rooms of Americans).
160. See id. at 352 (finding that the public combined the school shooter
problem with the myth that youth crime was on the rise).
161. John Cloud, The Columbine Effect, TIME , Nov. 28, 1999, http://content.
time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,35098,00.h tml.
In the mid-1990s,
Americans wanted a crackdown on school violence, and zero tolerance led the
way as the preferred method. Id.
162. See id. (reporting that many Americans wanted a “tough on crime”
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Because of the shock a school shooting causes, any news
coverage highlights not only the spontaneity of the event but also
draws increased attention, making it seem more prevalent. 163 The
media, playing catch-up to a sudden event, often fills in the gaps
with preconceived myths as it develops its coverage. 164 Much of the
narrative gets caught up in circular logic: the media reports on a
school shooting; the public sees the endless coverage and assumes
that school shootings are on the rise; and the media reports that
Americans believe that an epidemic of school shootings afflicts the
nation. 165 This moral panic 166 envelops the nation and creates a
populist wave that seeks an end to school violence no matter the
costs. 167 Unfortunately, elected officials ride the populist wave to

approach brought to schools).
163. Muschert, Myth of the Juvenile Superpredator, supra note 159, at 354.
164. Id.
165. See Scott Chenault, An Overview of the Relationship Between Juvenile
School Shootings, And the Media, 2004 J. INST. JUST. & INT’L STUD. 101, 105
(arguing that a moral panic requires a consensus between media reporting and
public perception); Ronald Burns & Charles Crawford, School Shootings, the
Media, and Public Fear: Ingredients for a Moral Panic, 32 CRIME , L. & SOC.
CHANGE 147, 159–60 (1999) [hereinafter Burns & Crawford, Ingredients for
Moral Panic] (describing how the media, the public, and politicians all feed off
one another to create a moral panic). To complicate matters more, when it comes
to guns in general, the media favors pro -gun-control over anti-gun-control
arguments. Guns, Bias, and the Evening News, NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATIO N
INSTITUTE FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION (1994), as reprinted in THE G UN CONTRO L
DEBATE 198, (Marjolijn Bijlefeld, ed. 1997).
A similar moral panic can be seen more generally when it comes to “mass
shootings.” Oliver Roeder, The Phrase “Mass Shooting” Belongs to the 21st
Century, FIVE THIRTYEIGHT.COM (Jan. 21, 2016, 7:00 AM), http://fivethirty
eight.com/features/we-didnt-call-them-mass-shootin gs-until-the-21st-century/
(diagramming the proliferation of the phrase “mass shooting” in media
reporting). A search and catalog of all the instances and iterations of the phrase
“mass shooting” in printed news showed an exponential increase from “exactly
two mentions” in 1980 to over 17,000 uses in 2015. Id. All of this increased
attention comes in spite of data that shows mass shootings have remained
relatively constant over the last 15 years, no matter what metric is being used.
See WILLIAM J. K ROUSE & DANIEL J. RICHARDSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV .,
MASS MURDER WITH FIREARMS : INCIDENTS AND VICTIMS , 1999–2013 at 13
(2015) (finding an average of 20.8 mass shootings incidents per year from 1999–
2003, 20.4 incidents per year from 2004–2008, and 22.4 incidents per year from
2009–2013); id. at 16 (finding an average of 4.2 mass public shootings per year
from 1999–2003 and 2004–2008, and 4.8 incidents from 2009–2013); id. at 24
(showing a chart measuring the Mass Public Shooting Murder Victim Rate as
wildly fluctuating between 1998 and 2013, but still only ranging between 0.4
and 2.1 victims per 10 million people).
166. See Burns & Crawford, Ingredients for Moral Panic, supra note 165, at
149 (finding that a “moral panic” occurs when “a substantial portion of society
feels that particular evildoers pose a threat to the moral order of society.”).
167. See id. at 152–53 (listing the variety of punitive measures taken in
attempts to reduce school shootings).
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enact a multitude of misguided, knee-jerk solutions that are in
desperate need of a problem. 168
Despite the sensationalism of school shootings by the media,
the statistics do not support the idea that another school shooting
lurks right around the corner. 169 From the 1992–1993 school year to
2011–2012, the total number of violent deaths per year among
students, teachers, and staff at all schools across the nation showed
a downward trend from fifty-seven to forty-five. 170 Proponents of
zero tolerance attribute this decrease to the effect of zero tolerance
policies. 171 However, many empirical studies have shown that zero
tolerance policies have no effect on school safety. 172 Rather than any
particular policy, such as zero tolerance, contributing to the decline

168. See ROBERS , ET AL., INDICATORS , supra note 13, at 16–17 (finding that
the number of reported victimizations in schools decreased in all measured
categories between 1995 and 2013 (the last year of the study)).
169. Cf. Annie Linskey, Mass Shootings Fuel Fear, Account for Fraction of
Murders, BLOOMBERG.COM (Sept. 16, 2013, 11:02 PM), www.bloomberg.com/
news/2013-09-17/mass-shootings-fuel-fear-account-for-fraction-of-murders.html
(reporting that in the three decades leading up to 2012, mass murders
accounted for less than one-tenth of one percent of all murders).
170. ROBERS , ET AL., INDICATORS , supra note 13, at 7 fig.1.1. Although the
data does show upward spikes for certain years (including the most recent year),
the overall number of homicides trends downward. Because the data charts only
the raw number of school homicides, the homicide rates would likely show an
even sharper decrease over the periods studied. Cf. id. at 11 fig.2.1 (showing the
rates of nonfatal victimization against students trending downward both at and
away from school).
171. Contra Scott Neuman, Violence in Schools: How Big a Problem Is It?,
NPR.ORG (Mar. 16, 2012, 1:25 PM), www.npr.org/2012/03/16/148758783/v io
lence-in-schools-how-big-a-problem-is-it (reporting researchers’ findings that
zero tolerance policies have shown to have no effect on decreases in school
violence). See also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE 2012 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 196
Table 306 (2012), www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/12statab/law.pdf (last visite d
on Oct. 23, 2014) (showing a steady drop in the number of offenses as well as
the overall rate in violent crimes in the United States); FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS , CRIME IN THE U.S. 2014: EXPANDE D
HOMICIDE DATA TABLE 8, www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/
crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/tables/expanded-homicide-data/expanded_homicide_dat
a_table_8_murder_victims_by_weapon_2010-2014.xls (showing a decreasing
trend in the overall number of murder victims by weapons).
172. See Skiba, supra note 16, at 9 (“Of schools with no reported crime, only
5% of principals reported moderate or stringent security measures; in contrast,
39% of schools with serious violent crimes reported using moderate to stringent
security.”); see also Kang-Brown et al., supra note 9, at 4 (claiming no studies
show zero tolerance has a positive effect on disruption or safety in the
classroom); APA ZT Task Force, supra note 55, at 853–54 (writing that the
evidence does not support assumptions that school violence is increasing and
zero tolerance helps maintain order).

2015]

Biting the Bullet

617

in violent school deaths, the decrease in school homicides more
likely reflects the national decline in violent deaths. 173
School safety should be taken seriously. Violent crime
statistics, however, do not indicate schools are any less safe now
than they were twenty years ago. Zero tolerance policies go too far
in addressing a more narrowly defined problem. Additionally, the
sensationalism surrounding school violence has swept up
legislatures and courts alike, making it difficult to protect student
speech without eradicating zero tolerance altogether.

IV. I F I T AIN’T FIXED, BREAK IT!
This comment proposes two steps to correct the follies of zero
tolerance weapons policies and protect student speech. Part IV.A
discusses some of the alternatives to zero tolerance and how they
can protect student speech. Ultimately, Part IV.A concludes that
none of these reforms will correct the problem absent a total repeal
of GFSA. Part IV.B discusses the subjective-intent standard to true
threats, and particularly why it best addresses the balance between
evaluating threatening speech and protecting student speech.

A. Reforming School Discipline Requires Eliminating
Zero Tolerance
Despite the grim outlook presented, all hope is not lost: people
have begun to notice the failures of zero tolerance policies. 174
Perhaps some of these outlandish examples of zero tolerance gone
awry have finally resonated with policy makers across the
country. 175 Zero tolerance policies undermine the obvious goal they

173. Neuman, supra note 171.
174. See Mongan & Walker, supra note 18, at 237 (finding no conclusive
empirical evidence that zero tolerance policies have been effective); see also
Kang-Brown et al., supra note 9, at 6 (describing a shift in opinions on the
effectiveness of zero tolerance).
175. E.g., Kelcie Pegher, Board of Education Changes Suspension Policy ,
CAPITAL G AZETTE (Aug. 21, 2014), www.capitalgazette.com/news/schools/ph- ac cn-suspensions-0821-20140821,0,7164033.story (working to shift away from
zero tolerance policies in Anne Arundel County, Maryland). Anne Arundel
County is the same county where our protagonist, th e breakfast bandit,
attended school. While it is not entirely certain that Anne Arundel County
officials adopted changes to their policies in light of the national media attention
to Joshua Welch’s story, it marks a larger shift nationwide away from such
extreme punishments. See Ray Henry, States Mull Dropping School “Zero
Tolerance” Rules, SOUTHEAST MISSOURIAN (Jun. 16, 2007), www.semissourian.
com/story/1217689.html (reporting that numerous states have considered or are
considering revising their policies on zero tolerance in schools).
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were created to achieve: keeping kids safe in school so they may
learn. 176
Since the mid-2000s, more people have taken notice of the
negative effects of zero tolerance policies. 177 While not quite a
populist movement, the shift away from zero tolerance has been
gaining significant traction. 178 Studies continue to show that zero
tolerance policies do not effectively address school violence, at
best, 179 and cause severe harm to children at worst. 180
Notably, the zero tolerance reform movement includes even the
Obama Administration, which has promoted a series of alternatives
to zero tolerance. 181 Citing studies showing that zero tolerance
produces terribly adverse effects on minority students, the U.S.
Department of Education created an array of alternative
approaches that schools can implement in lieu of expelling or
suspending students. 182 The plan emphasizes the need for positive
environments for learning rather than negative or intolerant
environments. 183 The guidelines highlight three principles that will
help promote a positive environment and best serve to protect the
students’ rights. 184

176. See Kang-Brown et al., supra note 9, at 2–3 (finding a forty-percent
increase in student suspensions or expulsions since the 1972–73 school year);
see also supra text accompanying note 36.
177. Henry, supra note 175.
178. Motoko Rich, Administration Urges Restraint in Using Arrest or
Expulsion to Discipline Students, NY TIMES (Jan. 8, 2014), www.nytimes.com/2
014/01/09/us/us-criticizes-zero-tolerance-policies-in-schools.html?_r=0 (reporting
that the Obama Administration seeks alternatives to expulsion and arrests for
students caught in the net of zero tolerance policies).
179. Kang-Brown et al., supra note 9, at 4.
180. Id. at 5–6.
181. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., G UIDING PRINCIPLES : A RESOURCE
G UIDE FOR IMPROVING SCHOOL CLIMATE AND DISCIPLINE (2014) [hereinafter
G UIDING PRINCIPLES ], www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/school-discipline/gu idin g principles.pdf (promoting positive learning environments and clear, definite
codes of conduct will enable children to behave better and avoid discipline issues
in the future). The Obama administration recognized the negative effects of zero
tolerance and seeks to correct some of those issues. By encouraging all school
districts to reevaluate their zero tolerance policies the debate can shift away
from the failures of zero tolerance and back towards ensuring child safety in
schools.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 2.
184. See id. at 2–4 (creating a positive environment requires (1) fostering
positive climates so at-risk students are more readily identifiable, (2) using clear
and consistent policies for student discipline, and (3) continuously reevaluating
the disciplinary plan in place).
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First, the plan recognizes the common adage of using “the
carrot or the stick,”185 and ultimately favors the carrot. 186 The
Department of Education suggests a multi-tiered system of
supports to create a safe and productive climate for students. 187
These supports include “universal” supports that set expectations
for all students, “targeted” supports consisting of group
interventions or mentoring, and “intensive” supports that involve
individual interventions. 188 The level of support varies depending
on the frequency with which a student acts out or misbehaves. 189
This selective support approach differs greatly from zero tolerance
by providing various levels of education and intervention before
punishing a student for misbehavior. 190
Following the warning system provided by the first principle,
the Department’s second principle includes the establishment of clear
and definite guidelines for school discipline. 191 The plan places
considerable emphasis on communication: between the school, the
students, and even the students’ parents. 192 The plan also states that
removal from the classroom should only be used in the most severe of
cases, and as a last resort. 193 In order to ensure that students can
learn in the positive environment created for them, they have to

185. Paul Brians, “Carrot on a stick” vs. “the carrot or the stick,”
http://public.wsu.edu/~brians/errors/carrot.htm l (last visited on Jan. 25, 2016) .
See also Kang-Brown et al., supra note 9, at 6–7 (highlighting studies and trial
programs in school districts that look for positive alternative s to zero tolerance
and show promise of success).
186. See G UIDING PRINCIPLES , supra note 181, at 5–6 (encouraging a return
to community-based education and citing research that says positive
reinforcement can lead to higher graduation rates and increased school safety).
187. Id. at 6.
188. Id.
189. See id. (assigning universal supports to “all students, prior to any
display of disruptive behavior,” targeted supports to students who occasionally
act out, and intensive supports “to students who display frequent, moderate, or
severe forms of misbehavior, or to students who have experienced trauma or
who display other risk factors.”).
190. See Mongan & Walker, supra note 18, at 239 (recommending the
inclusion of mens rea and threat assessment in zero tolerance to reduce the
number of expulsions). The one-strike feel of zero tolerance policies means
students have no warning before being expelled for a violation they might not
even realize they committed. Furthermore, the tiered support system provides
a level of consistency in student misbehavior, the second principle recommended
by the Department of Education. G UIDING PRINCIPLES , supra note 181, at 11.
191. G UIDING PRINCIPLES , supra note 181, at 11–12.
192. See id. at 12–13 (encouraging the involvement of families to drive home
the important parts of the school’s disciplinary policies).
193. Id. at 14–15. Considering the research on students removed from the
classroom setting, this caveat comes as little surprise in a strategy meant to
reform school discipline. Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, Multiple Responses, supra note
14, at 2.
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actually be present. The second principle would allow students to
remain in the classroom when they simply behave like children. 194
Finally, to maintain the positive environment and student
supports created by the first two principles, school administrators
must constantly follow-up and evaluate the policies they put in
place. 195 The consistent feedback from teachers, students, and
families should help to eliminate any unintended consequences
from the discipline policy. 196 A steady flow of communication and
feedback between school officials and students will also provide
students an appropriate framework when speaking. One of the
major drawbacks to zero tolerance comes from the rigid, yet
shifting, boundaries imposed by the laws. 197
Like the Department of Education, legislative bodies across the
country have begun reining in zero tolerance laws. 198 Some of the
proposed legislation likely seeks political points more than
anything. 199 But the legislation also reflects that people are fed up
with how far zero tolerance has spiraled out of control. 200
In Illinois, students in Chicago Public Schools have called on
the school board and the governor to fix the problems caused by zero

194. See Boccanfuso & Kuhfeld, Multiple Responses, supra note 14, at 3
(finding that the vast majority of suspensions and expulsions have nothing to
do with the most serious offenses).
195. See G UIDING PRINCIPLES , supra note 181, at 16 (establishing a datadriven assessment system is crucial to improvement).
196. Id. at 18.
197. See Hillyard & McDermott, Considerations, supra note 123, at 186
(arguing that zero tolerance policies discharge administrators from taking
“responsibility for their decisionmaking [sic].”).
198. E.g., H.B. 1058, 98th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013) (moving
away from expulsion and law enforcement referrals as the primary ways of
handling infractions); H.R. 795, 2014 Leg., 116th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2014)
(requiring school districts to create “standards for intervention” that provide an
array of alternatives to mandatory expulsion or suspension); S.B. 167, 130th
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 2013-14 (Ohio 2014) (“eliminat[ing] any policy of zero
tolerance for violent, disruptive, or inappropriate behavior”).
199. See H.R. 2625, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013) (withholding funds from
any educational institution that punishes a student for a very specific group of
actions). The proposed bill seeks to protect students like Joshua Welch, along
with countless other students whose punishments stem from overzealous
enforcement of zero tolerance. Id. The bill would provide protection to students
for “using a finger or hand . . . [or] writing utensil to simulate a firearm” and
other punished actions that have garnered media attention. Id.
200. See Randy Ellis, Oklahoma Lawmaker Files Bill to Protect Students
Creating Imaginary Weapons, THE O KLAHOMAN (Jan. 9, 2014), http://newsok.com
/oklahoma-lawmaker-files-bill-to- protect-studen ts-cre ating- imagin ary-weapo
ns/article/3921999 (quoting Oklahoma state representative Sally Kern as
wanting to “let children be children.”).
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tolerance policies. 201 The students sought support for HB 4655202
and SB 3004 which would limit expulsions to a “significant threat
of imminent serious harm” and suspensions to a “serious act of
misconduct.”203 The bill replaces the language in Illinois law
allowing schools to expel or suspend students for gross disobedienc e
or misconduct. 204 The proposed legislation grants schools the
additional power to suspend for up to three days any student who
poses a threat to the safety of other students or school staff. 205 The
Illinois Senate Bill, however, leaves the weapons policy mandated
by GFSA untouched. 206 The revisions to the school discipline policies
are certainly encouraging, but the addition of the “threat
suspension” shows that legislation by fear still rules the day.
Without repealing the Gun Free Schools Act or similar
legislation mandating expulsion for weapons possession, schools
will retain their broad discretion to punish students for harmless
actions. 207 Implementing alternatives to threat assessment in the
201. See Ellyn Fortino, CPS Students Want State Lawmakers to Fix “Broken”
School Discipline Policies, PROGRESS ILLINOIS .COM (Apr. 17, 2014, 11:59 AM),
www.progressillinois.com/quick-hits/content/2014/04/17/cps-students-want-statelawmakers-fix-broken-school-discipline-policie (calling for support of proposed
legislation SB 3004 and HB 4655).
202. H.B. 4655, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2014).
203. S.B. 3004, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2014). The two
versions of the bill passed through committee and have no current differences,
so this comment will refer to the Senate bill for discussion purposes.
204. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT 5/10-22.6(a),(b).
205. S.B. 3004, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. 5.
206. See generally S.B. 3004, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (making no
changes to the language defining prohibited weapons, including “any other
object if used or attempted to be used to cause bodily harm”).
207. Some people might counter that the GFSA is entirely necessary to
prevent violent deaths. See Patrick Kachur, et al., School-Associated Violent
Deaths in the United States, 1992 to 1994, 275 JAMA 1729 (1996), as reprinted
in THE G UN CONTROL DEBATE 226 (Marjolijn Bijlefeld, ed. 1997) (identifying
105 school-associated violent deaths in the two years immediately preceding the
passage of GFSA). The 1992–94 study indicates that “school-associated violent
deaths were more common than previously thought,” and it suggests “a
comprehensive approach that addresses violent injury and death among y oung
people at school.” Id. However, the rarity of a school shooting does not warrant
such an expansive solution that sweeps up and punishes student speech in the
process. See id. (finding that the “estimated incidence of school-associated
violent deaths was 0.09 per 100,000 student-years); discussion supra Part III.C.
In addition, no studies in the twenty years since the passage of GFSA indicate
that it worked. Supra note 36 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, repealing the GFSA will not open the floodgates for an
increase in school violence. Teachers will still retain the authority to control
classroom discipline. Discussion supra Part I.B. In fact, repealing GFSA would
return even more authority to teachers. Cf. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 (returning
discipline to a simpler, discretionary disruption standard rather than a
mandatory expulsion). Teachers would actually possess the authority to
determine the danger a student poses. See generally Morton, supra note 8, at
782, 784 (arguing that returning flexibility to student punishment as an
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classroom 208 while leaving the underlying problem in place is
functionally equivalent to throwing a new coat of paint over a
peeling wall. The new layers do not actually address the problem :
zero tolerance leaves no room for alternatives. 209
Additional training for teachers on how to respond to student
disruption does not magically replace the prerequisite to expel
someone who may be considered a threat. Moreover, the conditional
spending hook tied to the Gun Free Schools Act realistically
prevents states and individual schools from eliminating zero
tolerance weapons policies on their own. 210 Therefore, the Gun Free
Schools Act must be repealed before the Department of Education’ s
multi-tiered plan or state alternatives to zero tolerance can even
take effect.

B. Judge the Speaker, Not the Speech—Courts Need
to Use the Subjective-Intent Test
Because Virginia v. Black did not address whether an objective
or subjective intent test is appropriate in true threat cases, most
courts continue to apply an objective test. 211 Instead, the only times
intent has been stressed is when evaluating whether a person
intended to communicate a threat, as in Doe v. Pulaski County
Special School District.212 But unlike school administrators, who
may need to make a decision on student speech hastily, a judge has
little excuse for stopping the analysis of intent at communication.
Innocent students escape from the broad trappings of the true
threat doctrine only when courts apply the intent element to the
speech itself.
Adding a subjective-intent requirement to student speech
protects innocent students in three ways. First, the subjective intent test would eliminate much of the chilling effect the other
tests have on speech. 213 Attaching the intent requirement to the
communication only—instead of the message itself—removes true
threats from the narrowly proscribed space of intimidation that it

alternative to zero tolerance could result in fewer absurd stories about students
punished for speech).
208. See generally Salgado, supra note 10 (arguing for a particular threat
assessment model to be used when evaluating student speech).
209. See Teske, supra note 17, at 89 (citing studies that show the uniform
punishment dealt by zero tolerance polices make problems worse for students).
210. GFSA, 20 U.S.C. § 7151(b)(1).
211. See Elonis, 730 F.3d at 330 (finding a majority of courts did not see
Black as “requir[ing] a subjective intent to threaten.”).
212. Doe, 306 F.3d at 624–25.
213. See Salgado, supra note 10, at 1390 (indicating the objective speaker
test chills speech because a student must consider the reactions of teachers,
parents, or fellow students before speaking).

2015]

Biting the Bullet

623

occupies. 214 But the subjective-intent test would require a judge to
differentiate between child’s play and an actual threat. 215 Joshua
Welch clearly intended to show off his pastry pistol once he
determined it resembled a gun. 216 But despite saying “bang” when
he pointed the pastry, nothing indicates he was doing anything
more than playing with his food—hardly an offense worth
punishing. The subjective-intent test would protect students like
Joshua from the hypersensitive
audience public school
engenders. 217
Second, students whose speech may have been misunderstood
by a reasonable recipient receive protection from a subjective-intent
requirement. 218 A student’s case would require more than a mere
showing that someone could feel threatened by the speech. 219 The
subjective-intent test forces the school to argue why Joshua’s
actions were a threat, and thus punishable, instead of just taking
that for granted. 220
Finally, the subjective-intent test more appropriately
exonerates wrongly punished students. 221 This does not provide a
get-out-of-punishment-free card to students who genuinely
endanger others. 222 But when school officials classify every instance
of gun-related speech as a threat, applying this standard will
214. See Black, 538 U.S. at 359–60 (stating that even though a “speaker need
not actually intend to carry out a threat[,]” the test hangs on his “intent [to]
plac[e] the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.” (emphasis added)).
215. Cf. Stanner, supra note 91, at 412 (countering potential arguments that
an intent requirement would let the guilty go free).
216. See Joe Burris, Jennings Says Bill Responds to Student’s Gun-Shaped
Pastry Incident, BALTIMORE SUN (Mar. 20, 2013), http://articles.baltimoresun.com
/2013-03-20/news/bs-md-pastry-bill-20130320_1_gun-b-j-welch-jennings (quoting
Joshua’s father as saying his son knew he had done something wrong to play
with the pop-tart, but also stating “it was just a pastry. I couldn’t hurt anyone
with it.”).
217. Supra text accompanying note 128.
218. See Brief for Petitioner at 51, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001
(2015) (No. 13-983) (arguing that “the negligence standard poses a very real risk
of criminalizing ‘poorly chosen words.’”). Petitioner classified the objective test
as the “negligence standard” because without the mens rea requirement,
negligent speech cannot be protected from true threat prosecution. See generally
id. at 34–52 (summarizing the history of criminalizing negligent speech and
arguing that focusing on third party reactions “impermissibly chills speech”).
219. See Stanner, supra note 91, at 410 (noting that the subjective-inten t
test shifts the government’s burden of proof away from the reaction of the
listener and onto the intention of the speaker).
220. See id. at 411 (arguing that simply asserting the state of school violence
would no longer suffice in establishing a threat).
221. Contra Salgado, supra note 10, at 1389–92 (writing that
administrators’ reactions to supposed threats in three cases resulted in three
different rulings). The objective tests, while similar on the surface, ultimately
fails based on the capriciousness of individual justices each channeling their
interpretation of reasonable listeners in a school.
222. Stanner, supra note 91, at 412.
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provide relief to students who never intended to threaten others. As
an added benefit, the subjective-intent standard incentivizes
administrators to have legitimate proof of intent to threaten, rather
than a general discomfort from a student’s speech. 223
If prosecutors must prove intent in a criminal case against a
child defendant, the same standard should apply to student
speakers in zero tolerance cases with parallel punishments. 224 The
subjective-intent test sufficiently protects most students whose
speech may alarm some people but was never intended as a threat.
Additionally, it still contains enough bite to apply to truly
threatening speech, while generally allowing kids to be kids.

V. CONCLUSION
In the twenty-two years since the passage of GFSA, one thing
obviously stands out: zero tolerance weapons policies have resulted
in more harm than good. Too often, these policies punish innocent
children for behaving like children. While schools certainly want to
maintain school safety and discipline, zero tolerance policies
prevent schools from effectively accomplishing either. In order to
effect positive change on school discipline, the Gun Free Schools Act
must be repealed, allowing states to successfully pass meaningful
reforms. Additionally, courts must apply a subjective-intent test to
cases of allegedly threatening student speech so that those still
caught in the crosshairs can find relief.

223. Contra Salgado, supra note 10, at 1392 (noting that “[in applying the
objective test(s),] administrators are prone to classify virtually everything as a
threat, regardless of its actual nature, and then allow the courts to sort it out
later at the expense of taxpayers.”); cf. Lukianoff, supra note 127, at 46–47
(writing about a college professor who assaulted an abortion protestor and tried
to excuse her illegal actions because of her emotional discomfort).
224. See Avarita L. Hanson, Have Zero Tolerance School Discipline Policies
Turned Into a Nightmare? The American Dream's Promise of Equal Educational
Opportunity Grounded In Brown v. Board of Education, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV . L.
& POL’Y 289, 320–21 (2005) (arguing that the punishments rendered on a child
in a school setting—expulsion or suspension—mirror adult punishments).

